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G cyberspace is loosely defined as the
collection of computer communication
networks that has evolved since the early
1970s. Although it is most often associ-
ated with the Internet, a myriad of bul-
letin board providers and commercial
services are also included.
Vendors are attracted to cyberspace for
several reasons. First, millions of people
throughout the world have at least some
access to the "Net," and their ranks are
swelling. These users tend to be young,
educated, and wealthier than average —
characteristics that marketers find very
attractive.
1 Second, by building a pres-
ence in cyberspace, a business can offer
its goods and services relatively cheap-
ly, worldwide, and 24 hours a day.
Finally, a cyberpresence, by distributing
detailed information to potential con-
sumers, may also boost sales through
conventional channels.
What makes the emerging cybermarket
particularly exciting is that the technol-
ogy will allow many new products to be
developed and markets to be tapped.
With communications and computing
costs plunging, cyberservices will be
available to anyone with a telephone and
a personal computer.
Unfortunately, a number of problems
will have to be overcome as the elec-
tronic marketplace evolves. Currently,
not everyone has access, and many users
lack the high-speed equipment required
to take full advantage of the graphic
interfaces. A number of procedural and
legal challenges will also have to be
addressed, such as who — if anyone —
will control the content of the material
sold in cyberspace and how copyright
issues will be handled. But one of the
most vexing problems is how to pay for
cybergoods and services.
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• Why New Payment
Instruments Are Needed
Traditional means of making payments
(cash, check, credit card, automated
clearinghouse, wire transfer) conflict
with the characteristics of many cyber-
markets. In particular, many transactions
are likely to encounter problems of trust,
security, or size. To illustrate, consider
the following. After browsing the Web,
you decide that you'd like to download a
photo of Lance Armstrong winning a
stage in the 1995 Tour de France bike
race. If you find the image in one of the
many noncommercial sites on the Net,
you can simply download the picture,
since no payment is required. Volunteers
throughout the world have made a vast
quantity of useful information available
free of charge. But professionals — pho-
tographers included — are unlikely to
allow much of their work to be distrib-
uted widely without receiving some sort
of compensation.
A second possibility is that access to the
image will be available only to those
who subscribe to a particular on-line
service. On-line services bill their sub-
scribers per minute of connection time
and share some of that revenue with the
content provider (in this case, the photog-
rapher). This system works well when
you have established a prior, continuing
According to one market-research
firm, there will be more than 22 mil-
lion World Wide Web users by the
turn of the century, and two-thirds of
them will come from the consumer
ranks rather than from academia or
corporate America. As electronic
communications expand, cybermar-
kets are expected to burgeon. But one
issue that will have to be resolved
before the on-line marketplace can
truly compete with traditional mar-
kets is how to pay for the goods and
services sold in cyberspace.
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provider, but does not fit the standard
pattern of marketing.
A number of general payment problems
can arise when this prior relationship is
lacking. Suppose that a professional pho-
tographer having only a "home page"
presence on the Internet wants to market
pictures directly to individual buyers.
As a customer, you could mail the pho-
tographer cash (not advisable) or a check
(better), but "snail mail" is unlikely to be
a satisfactory solution. The necessary
trust probably doesn't exist between two
strangers in cyberspace. On one hand, if
the photographer provides the picture
immediately and has to trust a customer
to send the check, how many payments
might never be mailed? On the other
hand, if you as the customer can't down-
load the picture until your check clears,
should you get your money back if the
procedure doesn't work or if the product
is not as advertised?
Credit and debit cards seem somewhat
better suited to dealing with a lack of
trust among electronic strangers. The
seller could rely on the same verification
system used in filling phone orders from
catalogue shoppers. Purchasers would be
protected by Federal Reserve Regulation
E. which enumerates the rights, liabili-
ties, and responsibilities of participants
in electronic funds transfers. Ultimately,
however, cardholders as a group would
have to make up any loss.
Solving the matter of trust between buy-
ers and sellers would not eliminate all of
the problems. The Internet is an "open"
system that also raises questions of secu-
rity. Information travels over the Net in
packets that may pass through many
intermediate nodes before reaching their
final destination. At any point along the
way, someone with only a little techno-
logical expertise could set up a "packet
sniffer" to look for information resem-
bling credit card numbers. The odds are
slight that any given transaction would
be intercepted, but with millions of
transactions poised to occur in cyber-
space, the potential for credit and debit
card fraud is huge.
These cards have another problem:
They are not well suited to those trans-
actions for which coin and currency are
used in ordinary markets. The photogra-
pher may want only 50 cents for his dig-
ital picture, but the average cost of a
credit card transaction is at least 88
cents, making this an uneconomical
means of paying for small-value items.
In addition, the cost of becoming a
credit card merchant is not insignificant
and could further hinder the spread of
the electronic cottage industries that
some have envisioned. Credit card pay-
ments also lack the anonymity that cash
provides and that many people prize.
This extended example illustrates sev-
eral crucial points. In cyberspace, a ven-
dor can reach highly specialized market
niches quickly and effectively. In any
one city, only a few hundred people may
be interested in professional cycling, but
nationwide there are hundreds of thou-
sands of fans, and globally there are mil-
lions. Further, many payment instru-
ments are likely to evolve in cyberspace
—just as they have in the physical
world — with each geared to different
niches based on the dollar amounts
involved and on whether there is a long-
term relationship betw een the transact-
ing parties. Once the security issue is
resolved, these new methods of making
payments will widen access to cyber-
markets and stimulate the development
of new products.
• Ensuring Secure Payments
Many companies both large and small
are striving to develop secure methods of
making payments in c\ berspace.
6 The
proposals vary tremendously in terms of
the amount of privacy lhe\ retain for
payors. how costly the\ are to use. and
what parties are able to transact. Most
rely on credit or debit cards to make pas •
ments over the Internet, but a few are
much more ambitious, striving to create a
cyberspace equivalent to cash known as
"e-cash." There are two basic approaches
to protecting the secunt\ of payment
information — value-added networks
and encryption — and they may be
employed either separately or in tandem.
Value-Added Networks. The security
weakness of using credit and debit cards
stems from sending plain text over a
network that is open to anyone. The
most straightforward solution is not to
send information over the Internet at all.
By using a relatively more secure value-
added network (VAN) to handle confi-
dential data, the risk of interception is
greatly reduced. Information that flows
from the open network must pass
through "firewalls" (computers pro-
grammed to allow only authorized
transmissions to penetrate) before
reaching the VAN.
Encryption. The second general
approach to providing secure transac-
tions employs encryption, a method of
scrambling information before it is sent
out over a vulnerable open network.
This way, anyone intercepting the data
en route cannot make use of it. Encryp-
tion should be less expensive than the
value-added approach, since the costs of
an alternative, secure network are not
incurred. Of course, encryption requires
the party at the other end to have com-
patible software as well as the key to
unscrambling the information.
The most straightforward use of encryp-
tion is to incorporate it into Web brows-
ers, as several companies are seeking to
do. This enables credit or debit card
information to flow safely over open
networks. Encryption also allows much
more ambitious proposals.
Several companies are attempting to use
encryption technology to replicate the
features of finality and anonymity that
coins and currency possess. Currency has
finality because once you receive it, you
can verify fairly confidently that it is gen-
uine, and short of suing you, the payor
has no legal way to reverse the transac-
tion. Credit cards do not carry this fea-
ture. Currency is also anonymous. Mer-
chants do not accept cash from you
because you are you; they accept it
because they can verify that the money is
legal tender. In contrast, the validity of
credit card transactions depends on you
being who you say you are.
At least a few of these new approaches
to providing secure electronic payments
are likely to find profitable niches in
cybermarkets, but it is far too soon topredict which of the many specific pro-
posals might acquire wide acceptance.
The market may have room for only a
few, given the large network economies
present in using payment instruments.
The value of participating in one particu-
lar network rises as the number of mer-
chants and individuals with whom you
can transact expands. This suggests that,
eventually, a few dominant "brands" of
electronic payments will develop, just as
a few dominant ATM networks have
come to prevail.
• Policy Issues
New payment instruments raise new
issues. Encryption is one, since non-
mathematicians are likely to find it diffi-
cult to verify the degree of security it
brings to a payment device. The stronger
the encryption, the more secure the
instrument (and the less likely that the
government will allow the software to be
exported).
7
Even the best encryption may be vulner-
able to breakthroughs in computer tech-
nology or mathematics. In August 1977,
the inventors of RSA, the public key en-
cryption system employed in many pay-
ment networks, offered a reward to any-
one who could decipher a test phrase. At
the time, they estimated that it would
take 40 quadrillion years to break the
code. They were a little off. Last fall, a
team using 1,600 computers was able to
decipher the phrase with a technique that
allowed the problem to be broken up
into many smaller tasks. While RSA
could employ much longer key lengths
than the one used in its challenge (vastly
increasing the difficulty of breaking the
code), the lesson is clear: What is secure
today may not be secure tomorrow.
Another set of issues involves the legal
rights and protections of consumers,
merchants, and issuers. It appears that
Regulation E (covering credit, debit, and
ATM cards) applies to credit and debit
card purchases in cyberspace, but does it
also apply to e-cash? As the regulation
is written, the answer depends on the
particular implementation. Its protec-
tions should hold whenever a transaction
directly involves a financial institution,
but probably would not apply otherwise.
This leads to the question of who should
be permitted to issue e-cash. In most
cases, e-cash is the liability of the issuer.
Thus, while it circulates in cyberspace,
to what uses can consumers' funds be
put? Also, if the issuer is a depository
financial institution, should deposit
insurance and reserve requirements
extend to e-cash holdings? All of these
questions deserve careful consideration.
For the Federal Reserve, to the extent
that cyberspace credit and debit card
transactions displace similar physical
transactions, there should be no effect on
monetary policy. If checks and currency
are used less often, this will simply con-
tinue a long trend away from these
instruments' share of the payments sys-
tem. E-cash could be more complicated,
however, particularly if it bypasses
depository institutions and allows direct
transfers between individuals. In the
foreseeable future, cyberspace payments
of any type are likely to command a
minor share of the payments stream, so
the impact on monetary policy should be
correspondingly small.
For the Treasury, any type of electronic
payment that substitutes for currency is
likely to be costly. If people hold less
coin and currency, the Treasury will lose
seigniorage from the coins it mints as
well as the income associated with Fed-
eral Reserve Notes This reduces a hid-
den tax on consumers who use cash, but
unfortunately, it also removes one of the
few ways of taxing the underground
economy.
9 The Internal Revenue Serv-
ice could more than make up for this loss
if e-cash method* arc designed to track
each transaction (thereby ensuring
greater tax code compliance), but anony-
mous approaches would intlict some
severe headaches. One of the starkest
questions posed by electronic payments
(and the Internet in general) is how much
privacy society is willing to forgo to
make illegal activities more difficult.
Few of us would be pleased to find out
that someone had been following us
around 24 hours a day recording our
every activity, but this is precisely the
ability that some electronic payment
instruments (or regular credit and debit
card transactions, for that matter) may
give both authorized law enforcement
officers and "crackers" — hackers with
criminal intent. Purchasing information
services electronically makes it poten-
tially very easy to build up a digital pro-
file of consumers. This profile could be
employed in a variety of useful ways (by
you or your authorized agent) or for
insidious purposes (by anyone else).
Despite the best promises of payment
providers to protect confidential transac-
tion information, there are many ways it
could be released. Although a great deal
of attention is centered on hackers,
employee fraud and error (either inten-
tional or unintentional) will probably be
a much bigger problem. If the informa-
tion exists, there is always the potential
that it will be obtained by someone lack-
ing authorization.
• Conclusion
Whatever difficulties these new forms of
payment present, their advantages are
clear: They will lower the cost of some
existing goods and services and spur the
development of many new products.
The nuts and bolts issues can be resolved
relatively easily. Striking a balance be-
tween individual privacy and the con-
cerns of law enforcement will be much
more difficult, however. Given the many
challenges that the legal system faces in
the digital age, privacy could become a
scarce commodity if we do not choose
wisely now.• Footnotes
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